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tion of Parliament exclusively because the structures which he
erects are necessarily incidental to the operation of the mine?
These questions are typical of the many and varied issues that the
courts may have to settle in the no-man's land between provincial
jurisdiction and federal jurisdiction over contractors working upon
or supplying federal undertakings in any way.
N. J. STEWART*
TORTS-GRATUITOUS PASSENGER-ONTARIO HIGHWAY TRAFFIC
ACT, SECTION 105(2).-Many lawyers will no doubt think that the
Ontario High Court has taken abackward step in the recent decision
of Feldstein v. Alloy Metal Sales Ltd. and Matthews.' Put they need
not despair. This decision will not halt the recent surge of develop-
ment in the struggle to diminish the effect of section 105(2) of the
Ontario Highway Traffic Act.'
Mrs. Clara Feldstein, through an arrangement with Office Over-
load,' was sent to work as a stenographer for the defendant com-
pany Alloy Metal Sales Ltd, for a period of seven weeks. Her
salary was paid by Office, Overload, which in turn was paid by the
defendant company. The hours, conditions and methods of work
were dictated by Alloy. At the Alloy Metal Sales' office there was
an arrangement whereby a éompany=owned station wagon would
be driven uptown and back to the defendant company's office each
°'N . J . Stewart, of the Alberta Bar, Calgary . .
i [19621 O.R. 476 (Ont . H.C .), per Ferguson J .
' ' R.S.O ., 1960, c . 172 . The section reads as follows :
"(1) The owner of a motor vehicle is liable for loss or damage sustained
by any person by reason ofnegligence'ia the operation of the motor vehicle
on a highway unless the motor vehicle was without the owner's consent
in the possession of some person other than the owner or his chauffeur,
and the driver of a motor vehicle not being the owner is liable to the same
extent as the owner.
(2) Notwithstanding subsection 1, the owner or driver of a motor .
vehicle, other than a vehicle operated in the business of carrying passengers
for compensation, is not liable for any loss or damage resulting from bodily
injury to, or the death of any person being carried in, or upon, or entering,
or getting on to, or alighting from the motor vehicle ."
Subsection (2) was originally enacted in section 11 of S.O., 1935, c . 26 ;
it then became subsection (2) of section 47 of R.S.O ., .1937, c . 288 and
later subsection (2) of section 50 of R.S.O ., 1950, c. 167 . Despite its am-
biguity no change has been made in the language of the subsection- since
1935 .
a This is a corporation which operates in Toronto that places stenog-
raphers into offices usually on a part-time basis. Office Overload charges
a fee. to the employer and pays the employee
..
amount somewhat less
than this fee after deducting income tax.
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day at lunch hour if it was not engaged in other business . A person
who worked at the office could use this station wagon to go uptown
for shopping or other errands if he was one of the first eight people
who signed a list provided for the purpose each day.' Mrs. Feldstein
signed this list, and was allowed to use the station wagon. While
on her way uptown in the station wagon she was injured when it
collided with another vehicle due to the negligence of the defendant
driver Matthews, who was an employee of the defendant company
and who was in the course and scope of his employment. On these
facts the court was faced with one seemingly simple issue : did
section 105(2) bar the plaintiff from recovery? There were several
different theories that could have been utilized by the court to
awardjudgment to the plaintiff. Four of these theories were argued
at the trial . All four of them were rejected in turn and the case
against Alloy was dismissed.'
Probably the weakest argument advanced by counsel for the
plaintiff was that the station wagon was a "vehicle operated in the
business of carrying passengers for compensation". Thus it was
suggested that the plaintiff came within the "exception within an
exception" of section 105(2) .6 Although this clause appears to free
from the rigour of section 105(2) only a very limited group of
situations, it has been broadly construed . In a car-pool "of a com-
mercial nature" 7 where a definite sum of money is paid in return
for transportation' the courts have allowed recovery to passengers.
Although technically this could hardly be called a "business of
carrying passengers for compensation", in Ouelette v. Johnson,9
the Supreme Court recently affirmed the principle of Lemieux v.
Bedard" as follows : "One vyho enters into an agreement to trans-
port other persons in his aftomobile on a particular journey, in
return for payment of an agreed sum of money, and proceeds to
4 See Feldstein v . Alloy, supra footnote 1, at p . 485 .
6The action against Mr. Matthews was dismissed on consent at the
opening of the trial .
6 See Laidlaw J.A . in Jurasits v . Nemes, [1957] O.W.N . 166, (1957),
8 D.L.R. (2d) 659 (Ont . C.A .) .
7 See Ouelette v . Johnson, [1963] S.C.R . 96, per Cartwright J ., at p . 100.
Csehi v. Dixon, [1953] O.W.N . 238, [1953] 2 D.L.R . 202 (C.A .) was ex-
pressly disapproved. See also Wing v . Banks, [1947] O.W.N . 897 (C.A .) ;
Dunnigan v . Gareau, [1954] O.W.N . 504 (alternative holding) ; Demianiw v .
7inkewich, [1953] O.W.N . 121 (Co . Ct . J ., Alta .) ; Smith v . Steeves (1958),
41 M.P.R. 91 (N.B.C.A .) (commercial connotation) .
s Chote v. Rowan, [1943] O.W.N . 6, [1943] 1 D.L.R . 339 . But see
Turnowski v. Turnowski, 226 N.Y.S . 2d 738 (Supreme Court of King's
County) where payment of a brother's hotel bill in return for a drive to a
resort did not amount to "compensation".
9 See supra, footnote 7 .
10 [1953] O.R . 837, [1953] 4 D.L.R . 252 af1g. [1952] O.R. 500, [1952]
D.L.R. 421 .
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carry out the agreement, makes it his business on that occasion to
carry passengers for compensation."" In the ®uelette case the
amount agreed to be paid was not based on the cost- of gas or oil
but on an amount that one of the passengers had paid to someone
else on another occasion . 12
In a dictum Mr. Justice Cartwright disapproved of Csehi v.
Dixon which disallowed recovery on the basis that the fee paid
was arrived at by estimating a portion of the cost of gasoline and
oil used by the defendant." His Lordship said that "once it has
been determined that the arrangement between the parties was of
a - commercial nature the manner in which the amount of the fee
to be paid was decided upon becomes irrelevant"'.14 This interpreta-
tion has been extended to include cases where money is paid. on
only one occasion" and even where the plaintiff himself does not
pay but other passengers do." If the arrangement is merely a social
one or an expense-sharing one, recovery would still probably not
be allowed, perhaps even when a lump sum figure was arrived at . 17
This reasoning seems to have incorporated the contract of
carriage theory which was a separate theory before Lemieux v.
Bedard's into the exception within an exception theory. But it
does seem clear that for this exception within an exception theory
to apply, there must be a direct payment of money or money's
worth and that this compensation must be the primary object of
the defendant." It is not sufficient that some economic benefit is
derived by the defendant.2° The trial judge was on sound ground
when he refused to say that this station wagon came within the
exception clause in that no money changed hands directly and the
prime object of the transportation was not the "compensation" .
11 Supra, footnote 7, at p . 100 .
12 Ibid., at p . 99 . 13 Ibid., at p . 100 .
14 Ibid. But see Turnowski v. Turnowski, supra, footnote 8 .
11 Lemieux v . Bedard, supra, footnote 10, per Pickup C.J.O ., at p . 842.is Bohm v. Maurer, [1958] O.R . 249 (C.A.) aff'g. on other grounds [1957]O.W.N . 373, (1957), 9 D.L.R . (2d) 349 .lr Shaw v . McNay, [1939] O .R. 368 . See the recent decision in Johnson
v . Reisel (1963), 41 W.W.R. 536 (Man. Q.B .), per Campbell J ., where a"loose arrangement" to pay four dollars per week was held to be a "con-venience acceptable to both parties but not a contract for hire" withins . 99(2) of the Manitoba Highway Traffic Act, R.S.M., 1954, c . 112 . Thecourt said that the plaintiff was not a "guest without payment" re s. 99(1)since that would require some "social implication" . But instead of allowingrecovery, it was denied . It is to be hoped that this decision will be reversedon appeal . See also Neufeld v. Prior (1963), 42 W.W.R . 129 (B.C.S.C.)per McInnes J ., where there was a point venture by two salesmen and anexpense sharing deal and recovery was denied.
13 See supra, footnote 10.
11 Jurasits v . Nemes, supra, footnote 6, per Laidlaw J.A., at pp . 16~(O.W.N .), 665-666 (D.L.R .) .
20 Ibid.
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It is submitted, however, that the court could have reasoned that
this vehicle was normally used in the business of the defendant
company for the transportation of customers and employees and
in doing the errands of the company. Although there was no
direct money payment in return for transportation in the station
wagon there was a more direct economic benefit derived by the
company from its use than there was in Jurasits v. Nemes. 21 In
addition, it might fairly have been said that Jurasits dealt only
with the case of a privately owned vehicle normally used for personal
pleasure and that this vehicle was company owned and used con-
tinually on company business . Thus, it could be argued that the
statement of Laidlaw J. in Jurasits was obiter dictum.'-'2 However,
on balance, the trial judge was probably wise in refusing to decide
Feldstein in this way. Perhaps it would have been stretching the
wording of the statute too far beyond its already over-extended
position .
A stronger theory that was advanced by counsel for the plaintiff
was that section 124 of the Workmen's Compensation Act 23 gave
Mrs. Feldstein a statutory cause of action . It reads as follows :
Where personal injury is caused to a workman . . . . by reason of the
negligence of his employer or ofany person in the service of his employer
acting within the scope of his employment, the workman . . . have an
action against the employer . . . .
This section is in Part II of the Act which applies to persons whose
employment is of a casual nature and to industries that are not
covered by Part I of the Act." Mrs. Feldstein was engaged in casual
work. She was held to be a "workman" as defined in the Act.25
Alloy Metal Sales was the "employer" of the plaintiff.26 Mr .
Matthews was clearly a "person in the service of his employer
acting within the scope of his employment". Thus Mrs. Feldstein
should have been entitled to recover on a literal reading of the
statute. However in an enigmatic paragraph His Lordship seems
to have held that since the defendant company was covered by
Part I of the Act, Mrs. Feldstein in order to recover had to show
that the accident arose out of and in the course of the plaintiff's
employment .2' This is clearly wrong. A Part I limitation was applied
to a situation where it was not supposed to apply. Part I of the
Act is administered by the Workmen's Compensation Board. Under
this part, when a workman is injured during the course of his
21 Ibid. 22 Ibid.
2$ R.S.O ., 1960, c . 437 . 24 Ibid., s . 123 .
2E See Feldstein v. Alloy Metal Sales, supra. footnote 1, at p . 488 .
26 Ibid. 27 Ibid., at p . 482.
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employment in an industry covered by the Act, he may recover
compensation ftom the Board without court action ; 2s indeed he is
foreclosed from taking court action . Part If ofthe Act is administer-
ed by'the courts and not by the Board. It is independent of Part I
and covers industries as well as workmen not covered by Part I.
Section 124 is in Part II of the Act and creates a cause of action
against an employer when one person in his service negligently
injures another of his employees. 2 9 The section does not stipulate
that the injuredperson is required to be in the course of his employ-
ment. Only the negligent person must be in the course of his em-
ployment. Indeed, if Mrs. 7Feldstein was in the course of her em-
ployment, she would have been covered by Part I and would have
had to claim under that part alone. It was because she was not
covered by Part I that she had to commence a court action for
compensation under Part II . Strangely enough although statements
appear elsewhere in the decision, in which the trial judge seems to
have agreed with this interpretation of section 124, 3 ° he failed to
decide the case on this basis.
The trial judge is also clearly wrongwhen he hints that section
105(2) has obliterated this cause of action." Harrison v. Toronto
Motor Car is explicit in deciding that section 105(2) removed only
the newly-created cause of action against an owner qua owner,
but did not "bar a right of action due to some other relationship"32
If he is liable as an employer under section 124 of the Workmen's
Compensation Act, section 105(2) of the Highway Traffic Act does
not extinguish that action.
The third argument advanced had even more merit. In Dorosz
and Dorosz .v. Koch" it was decided that a baby-sitter's family
could recover from the baby-sitter's employer when she was killed
while being driven home from work one night due to the negligence
of the employer's wife. The court said that there was a term in the
contract of employment with the defendant employer providing
for safe carriage." This argument which must be distinguished
23,23 See ss . 3 and 15 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, supra, footnote
.
21 See Humphreys v. City of London, [1935] O.R. 91, per Kerwin J., at
p . 96. See also dissenting opinion of Roach J.A . in Kent v . Bell, [1946]
O.R. 743 .
SU Supra, footnote 1, at p . 482. "1 have little doubt that if s . 50(2)
[now 105(2)] . . . had not been passed by the Legislature, the plaintiff
would have a cause of action against the defendant company . . . ."
31 Ibid.
.32 See [1945] O.R . 1, at p . 13, [1945] 1 D.L.R. 286, at p . 294 . --
33 [1962] O.R . 145, (1962), 31 D.L.R . (2d) 179 aff'g. [1961] O.R . 442 .
Comment, (1962), 40 Can . Bar Rev. 284.
34 Ibid., at pp . 106 (O.R.), 140 (D.L.R.) . See also Kearney v . Livesey
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from the exception within the exception is completely outside the
statute. It had its genesis in the broad statement in Harrison." In
Feldstein it was submitted that there was a contract of employment
between Mrs. Feldstein and Alloy, the terms of which included the
right to a safe station wagon ride uptown on occasion. Thus it
was submitted that Dorosz was applicable . This argument was
rejected by the court. In distinguishing Dorosz the trial judge gave
a classic example of a distinction without a difference . He said
that the station wagon was a "form of convenience which the
employees might use. It was in the same class as the use of the
chairs in the lounge. It was something given voluntarily, a conveni-
ence which the defendant was in no way required tofurnish . Nothing
happened as in Dorosz v. Koch. Mrs. Feldstein did not say to Mrs.
Boyd that she would not titvork for the defendant unless the transpor-
tation was furnished as Mrs. Dorosz appears to have said to Mrs.
Koch"." This notion is a strange and novel one. It seems to require
that before a specific term is included in a contract, one of the
parties must require that the term be included andhe must threaten
not to enter the contract or to terminate a contract already entered
into. There are no cases that require this type of evidence . The
Dorosz case did not turn on this fact . Granted that the request is
evidence of the existence of the term but not the only evidence .
Other evidence should suffice . What is important for the formation
of a contract is manifestation of consent, 37 not requests, demands,
or threats. Often parties to contracts insert clauses for the benefit
of other parties without being asked for them. They are nonetheless
binding. Indeed, standard form contracts are becoming very com-
mon nowadays." A party to one of these contracts might be hard
pressed to show that he had required each of these clauses to be
inserted or that he would not have entered the contract if any of
these terms had not been included . The terms become part of the
contract when it is executed . Oral contracts may have terms implied
in certain cases." The court should have implied one here. Although
the cour t was entitled to say that there was no evidence that this
(1963), 38 D.L.R . (2d) 290, per Haines J . recently affirmed by the Ont-
ario Court of Appeal but not yet reported .
36 Supra, footnote 32 and accompanying text .
38 Feldstein case, supra, footnote 1, at p . 485 .
37 See generally, Cheshire & Fifoot, The Law of Contract (5th ed .,
1960), p . 19 ; Williston, A Treatise on the Law of Contracts (3rd Student's
ed ., 1957), p . 45 .
33 See Cheshire & Fifoot, op . cit ., ibid., pp . 22-24 ; Sales, Standard
Form Contracts (1953), 16 Mod. L . Rev . 318 .
39 For example in oral contracts of sale of goods . See The Moorcock
(1889), 14 P.D . 64 and Cheshire & Fifoot, op . cit ., ibid., p . 139 for limita-
tions on this power .
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term was part of the contract of employment and that it would
not imply one, it did not and merely ignored the Dorosz case.
The trial judge went on to confuse the Dorosz case with the
exception within the exception . He appears to have thought that
for Dorosz to apply there must have been compensation paid
directly in return for the transportation . But that was not done in
Dorosz . The very importance ofDorosz was that the court extended
the idea of recovery on a breach of contract theory to cases other
than those where money was paid directly for transportation. The
court in Dorosz found aterm in a contract of employment providing
for safe carriage . The main object of the contract was employment.
Transportation was only incidental to that contract. No money
was directly paid in return for the transportation. Yet recovery
was allowed by the Ontario Court of Appeal . This case is not an
example of the application of the exception within the exception;
nor is it an example of a simple contract of carriage which was a
separate theory for recovery but now may have been incorporated
by the Ouelette case into the exception within the exception.4° In
Feldstein the court should have followed Dorosz and said that
there was a term in the contract of employment providing for safe
carriage and that Alloy was liable on this theory. This decision
ought not to be followed by other trial judges since one trial judge
cannot bind another.41 In any event, Feldstein conflicts with Dorosz
and thus Dorosz must stand and Feldstein must fall . 42
The fourth argument was probably the most important of all.
Alloy Metal Sales should have been liable as master for the tort
of its'. servant, Mr. Matthews, committed in the course and scope
of his employment. Although five different published works are
unanimously agreed that this was the effect of Harrison v. Toronto
Motor, Car, 4 3 the Ontario courts have not yet seen fit to agree.
However in no case to date did they have to face the issue squarely . 44
40 See text accompanying footnote 18, supra.
41 "Every court is bound to follow any case decided by a court above
it in the hierarchy, and appellate courts are bound by their previous de-
cisions" . See Cross, Precedent in English Law (1961), p . 5 . But see Wells
J. in Dominion Bridge Co . v . Carbno (1961), 29 I .L.R . (2d) 507, at p. 508
where he indicates that he is bound by the ChiefJustice of the High Court. It
may be that Feldstein is per incuriam . See Young v. Bristol Aeroplane Co.,
[1944] K.B . 718, Cross, op. cit ., p . 138 .
42 See Cross, op . cit ., ibid., p . 136.
11 Wright, (1945), 23 Can . Bar . Rev. 344 ; Morton, (1958), 36 Can. Bar
Rev. 414 ; Linden, op . cit ., footnote 33 ; Brown and Ball (1962), 2 Osgoode
Hall L.J . 322 (student article) ; Ball, (1963), 2 Osgoode Hall L.J . 530
(student note) .
44 In durasits v . Nemes, supra, _footnote 6, the employer himself was
driving and thus there was no issue of vicarious liability for the tort of a
servant . In Lexchin v . McGillivray, [1959] O.W.N. 96, (1959), 17 D.L.R .
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In Feldstein the court was given the opportunity to right its errors
of the past but failed to do so . Again it failed to see the argument
advanced by counsel and in the above articles . It formulated the
argument erroneously as follows : "Section 50(2) [now (105)(2)] is
not a bar to the action because the plaintiff was a servant of the
defendant Alloy at the time and as a servant she has a cause of
action against her master for negligence." 46 Clearly Mrs. Feldstein
was not acting in the course of her employment at the time of the
accident . If she were, she might have been able to rely on Duchaine
v. Armstrong 46 or claim the benefit of Part I of the Workmen's
Compensation Act provisions . She may not have needed the aid of
the court. Indeed she would probably have been excluded from
court. The argument was and is that Mr. Matthews made Alloy
liable vicariously for a tort that he committed during the scope of
his employment. It is submitted that this was the view of Gillanders
J.A . in Harrison eighteen years ago and is the present view of all
the authors .4' The court dismissed the argument without under-
standing it by saying that Mrs. Feldstein was not in the course of
her employment. This argument should not be confused with the
argument based on section 124 of the Workmen's Compensation
Act that requires the plaintiff to be a "workman" to come under
the Act. The argument based on vicarious liability is wider and
would allow recovery by non-workmen and non-employee passen-
gers of the defendant. In the company bus situation all passengers
could recover regardless of their employment status . This principle
if adopted would be a major victory for the opponents of section
105(2) . Therefore there is danger that the court will refuse to go
this far in the absence of legislation . At least the issue should be
faced. It may be that the court will limit the action to employees
or "servants" of the defendant suing for the negligence of fellow
servants. If so, this theory would resemble closely the theory
(2d) 408, the driver was not a servant of the defendant . See also Duchaine
v. Armstrong, [1957] O.W.N . 251 where a new cause of action was created
in favour of a servant against his master based on a misunderstanding of
Harrison, supra, footnote 32.
's See Feldstein, supra, footnote 1, at p . 480 . This argument was the
one advanced in Duchaine v. Armstrong, ibid.
4s ]bid.
°r "If the appellant has a cause of action against her master by reason
of the negligence of his servant, ss . 2 of s . 47 [now 105(2)] does not take it
away even though at the time it arose she was being carried in her employ-
er's motor vehicle", supra, footnote 32, at pp . 293-294 (D.L.R .) . Compare
the headnote relied upon by the later courts in [1945] O.R . i with the one
in [1945] 1 D.L.R. 286 . Mr . Ball argues that this is "clearly" the decision
in Harrison but in fact it is ambiguous, since in Harrison the nurse was
within the scope of her employment . Thus the statement of Gillanders
J.A. could be properly limited to those facts . See footnote 43, supra.
19631
	
Comments 601
advanced in connection with section 124 of the Workmen's Com-
pensation Act. It may be merged with it. Or . it may be that the
court will limit this argument to the situation where the plaintiff
is in the course of his employment. The court certainly had an
obligation to deal with this argument when confronted with it
directly .
An argument that was not advanced might have been utilized
by the court to find for Mrs. Feldstein . Although the accident did
not occur in the course of the employment it did arise out of the
employment. This phrase was used by the court in denying recovery
in Jurasits when it said that the accident did not occur "_in the
course of or arise out of her employment" .41 The two branches of
this statement appear to have different meanings .49 "Arise out of"
is a broader phrase than "in the course of" . In Dorosz, Schatz ,I.
at trial held alternatively that the accident there "arose out of" the
employment though perhaps not "in the courseof*" it" thus bringing
these facts within the Harrison rule as interpreted in Jurasits. The
Court of Appeal in Dorosz did not refer to this theory . It is sug-
gested that this argument is open to the court. Jurasits is distinguish-
able on the facts from Dorosz . In Jurasits the plaintiff had not yet
commenced to work for the defendant when the accident occurred .
But in Dorosz the work had been completed for the night and had
been going on for a time . In Feldstein, the plaintiff had already
worked several days for the defendants . It is admitted that these
distinctions are fine ones, but this is an area where the court seems
to relish fine distinctions." It might also have been decided. that the
Duchaine theory of liability to a servant could be extended to
servants on their lunch hour when transported in company cars . 52
In conclusion, counsel should not worry needlessly, over the
Feldstein decision . It is out of step with the development#at has
taken place in this area of the law of torts. In all likelihood the
Court of Appeal will overrule it as soon as it gets the opportunity."
Other trial judges should refuse to follow this decision since it
conflicts with Dorosz . It is safe to predict that Feldstein v. Alloy
'$ See, supra, footnote 6, at pp . 169 (O.W.N.), 663 (D.L.R.) .
49 Cf. s . 3(2) of the Workmen's Compensation Act, supra, footnote 23,
where by definition they appear to be the same. See also Noell v . C.P.R.,
[1952] 2 S.C.R. 359.so [1961] O.R. 442, at p . 444 . See for a discussion of the different mean-
ings of these words, Bowers v . Hollinger, [1946] O.R . 526 .
U See my criticism of the distinction without a difference raised by J .
Ferguson in text accompanying footnote 36, supra .
52 So too if on their way to work, but probably not if on their way
home, see Bowers v . Hollinger, supra, footnote 50 ; at p . 532 .
51 Notice of appeal was filed but the case was settled before it was
argued in the Court of Appeal.
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Metal Sales Ltd. and Matthews will neither halt judicial craftsman-
ship from continuing to flourish in limiting the scope of section
105(2) nor will it stop the ultimate legislative abolition of the sec-
tion .b 4
A. M. LINDEN
TORTS-NEGLIGENT PUBLICATION OF FALSE STATEMENTS-NATURE
OF DUTY OF CARE-PERSONS POSSESSING SPECIFIC SKILLS.-The
recent decision of the House of Lords in Hedley Byrne & Co. Ltd.
v . Heller & Partners Ltd.' will compel a re-examination of Guay v .
Sun Publishing Co . Ltd. 2 as a final authority on the question of
liability arising from the negligent publication of a false statement.;
While on the facts Guay v. Sun Publishing Co. Ltd. may have been
correctly decided, it is now apparent that the decision can only be
justified on different grounds than those set forth in the judgments .
In Guay v . Sun Publishing Co . Ltd. the newspaper published an
erroneous report that the plaintiff's husband and her children had
been killed in an automobile accident. The plaintiff read the report
and alleged that she had suffered injuries from grief and shock in
consequence. The trial judge held the defendant liable to the plain-
tiff for the negligent publication of the false report on the basis of
Donoghue v . Stevenson. 4
On appeal to the British Columbia Court of Appeal the court
(O'Halloran J.A. dissenting) held that Donoghue v . Stevenson had
no application to a case of negligent utterance or publication of
non-defamatory words. The court reversed the trial judge following
Shapiro v . La Mortal and Balden v. Shorter,s both of which deci-
sions held that honest belief in the truth of the statements was a
54 Abolition was recently recommended in a submission to a Select
Committee of the Ontario Legislature : see report of Special Committee
of Law Society of Upper Canada (1962), p . 12. The Select Committee
however, did not see fit to adopt this recommendation . The "loss insur-
ance" system suggested by the Committee if adopted will however alleviate
to a great extent the plight of the gratuitous passenger.
*A . M . Linden, of Osgoode Hall Law School, Toronto .
1 [19611 3 W.L.R . 1225 (C.A .), [19611 3 All E.R . 891 (C.A.), [19631
2 All E.R . 575 (H.L .) .
2 [1951] 4 W.W.R . (N.S .) 549, [195114 D.L.R . 756 (S.C.B.C.), (1952),
5 W.W.R. (N.S .) 97, [1952] 2 D.L.R . 479 (B.C.C.A .), [19531 2 S.C.R.
216, [195314 D.L.R. 577 (S.C.C.) .
a See M. M. McIntyre, A Novel Assault on the Principle of No Liability
for Innocent Misrepresentation (1953), 31 Can. Bar Rev. 770.
4 [1932] A.C . 562, 101 L.J.P.C. 119, 147 L.T . 281 (H.L .) .
s (1923), 40 T.L.R. 201, 130 L.T . 622 (C.A.) .
6 [19331 1 Ch . 427, 102 L.J.Ch. 191 .
